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We cannot expect perfection from the criminal justice system. Inevitably,
some innocent people will be punished and many guilty unpunished. We can and
must, however, expect a good-faith effort to address systematic flaws which
predictably produce injustice. A long and growing literature establishes and seeks
to explain the surprising prevalence of false confessions. The question arises: are
those in position to ameliorate the problem taking appropriate steps?
To some extent, yes. Law enforcement increasingly records the interrogations
of felony suspects,' and courts increasingly permit expert testimony about
interrogations and confessions. 2 Such reforms, however, are too little too late-too
little because juries may convict the false confessor even if they see the
interrogation and hear the expert testimony, and too late because, even if the jury
acquits, great harm will already have occurred. To address the tragedy of false
confessions most effectively, we must go to the source-the interrogation methods
that all too often produce such confessions in the first place.4
The leading interrogation manual, setting forth what has come to be known as
the "Reid Technique," turned fifty in 2012.s Just four years after its publication in
1962, this manual, published by the firm (Reid and Associates) that conducts the
* Lecturer in the Humanities and Chair, Justice and Law Studies, Williams College. J.D.
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1 See Saul M. Kassin et al., Police-Induced Confessions: Risk Factors and
Recommendations, 34 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 3, 26 (2010).
2 See Nadia Soree, When the Innocent Speak: False Confessions, Constitutional Safeguards,
and the Role ofExpert Testimony, 32 AM. J. CRIM. L. 191 (2005) (citing cases).
The obvious harms to the wrongly accused but eventually exonerated defendant-
prolonged incarceration, loss of income and reputation, and fear of worse-are compounded by the
fact that the actual culprit will remain at large. See Kassin et al., supra note 1, at 23 ("Numerous
false confession cases reveal that once a suspect confesses, police often close their investigation").
4 There are many causes of false confessions, e.g., some people come forward and confess
voluntarily. See generally SAUL M. KAssIN & LAWRENCE S. WRIGHTSMAN, CONFESSIONS IN THE
COURTROOM (1993). However, the most common cause appears to be interrogation methods widely
utilized by law enforcement. See Richard J. Ofshe & Richard A. Leo, The Decision To Confess
Falsely: Rational Choice and Irrational Action, 74 DEN. L. REv. 979, 983 (1997) ("confessions by
the innocent still occur regularly, and will likely continue until police and other criminal justice
officials develop a better understanding of the dangers of contemporary interrogation practices").
5 FRED E. INBAU ET AL., CRIMINAL INTERROGATIONS AND CONFESSIONs (1962).
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6
most widely attended training sessions for interrogators, attracted scathing
commentary from the United States Supreme Court. In the seminal case of
Miranda v. Arizona,7 the Court crafted its famous warning to criminal suspects in
large part to protect against the psychological coercion at the heart of the Reid
Technique.8 A year later, in 1967, Reid and Associates produced a second edition
that incorporated Miranda warnings into its course of instruction, even as the
authors brushed aside the Court's criticism.9
1986 brought forth a third edition of the manual, "an entirely new book"
responsive to developments in the law governing confessions and interrogations
and to improvements in the "art of interrogation."10 Though there would be
refinements in subsequent editions, the 1986 manual set forth the essentials of the
Reid Technique as we know it today. However, while expressing opposition to
"any interrogation tactic or technique that is apt to make an innocent person
confess,"" the manual had little to say about the risk of false confessions.12 The
omission was understandable, as this edition pre-dated the work of the Innocence
Project, which awakened legal scholars and social scientists to the frequency of
false confessions and spurred intense inquiry into their causes.13
Subsequently, Reid and Associates has produced two new editions of its
manual, a fourth edition in 2001 and fifth in 2011, which include new material
6 See FRED E. INBAU ET AL., CRIMINAL INTERROGATIONS AND CONFESSIONS viii (5th ed.
2011) (stating that "the Reid Technique of Interviewing and Interrogation is now taught in seminars
across the United States, Canada, Europe, and Asia" and "hundreds of thousands of investigators
hav[e] received this training.").
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
Id. at 457 ("It is obvious that such an interrogation environment is created for no purpose
other than to subjugate the individual to the will of his examiner. This atmosphere carries its own
badge of intimidation. To be sure, this is not physical intimidation, but it is equally destructive of
human dignity.").
9 They opined that "[t]he Court's critical comments about the procedures we advocated were,
we believe, for the purpose of establishing the necessity for the warnings rather than as a
condemnation of the procedures themselves." JOHN E. REID ET AL., CRIMINAL INTERROGATIONS AND
CONFESSIONS I (2d ed. 1967). They added that if the Court disapproves of the Reid Technique, it
would have no choice but "to outlaw all interrogations of criminal suspects. We say this because of
our confidence that effective interrogations can only be conducted by such procedures as the ones we
herein describe." Id
10 FRED E. INBAU ET AL, CRIMINAL INTERROGATIONS AND CONFESSIONs v (3d ed. 1986).
" Id. at xiv (emphasis in original).
12 There were a few scattered references to the issue, e.g., "an interrogator should view with
considerable skepticism any 'conscience-stricken' confession. Such a confession is very likely to be
false." Id. at 197.
13 See False Confessions, THE INNOCENCE PROJECT, available at
www.innocenceproject.org/understand/False-Confessions.php. (last visited Apr. 17, 2014) (as of July
7, 2012, "[i]n about 25%" of the 292 cases of wrongful convictions established by DNA testing,
"innocent defendants made incriminating statements, delivered outright confessions or pled guilty").
804 [Vol 11:2
GOING TO THE SOURCE
ostensibly responsive to the increased concern about false confessions.14  This
essay focuses on the adequacy of the response. It concludes that while in certain
respects Reid and Associates has made important concessions and
accommodations, in crucial respects it has ignored or distorted what has been
learned about false confessions, thereby assuring that this disturbing phenomenon
will remain pervasive.
I. THE REID METHOD EXPLAINED AND CRITIQUED
The Reid Technique of interrogation is presented as a nine-step process, but
the various steps can usefully be reduced to three: isolation, confrontation, and
minimization.15  The process begins by placing the suspect in a small, barely-
furnished room, apart from friends, family, familiar surroundings, or any support
system. This isolation increases the suspect's anxiety and eagerness to extricate
himself from the situation.
The interrogation itself typically begins with an accusation of the suspect,
buttressed by the suggestion that the interrogators have irrefutable evidence,
sometimes fabricated.'6 Denials of guilt are aggressively cut off. The idea is to
communicate to the suspect the futility of maintaining innocence. Subsequently,
the interrogators seek to minimize the nature or consequences of the crime.
Minimization themes, which include (but are not limited to) accident, justification,
provocation, mitigating circumstances, and secondary role, lead the suspect to infer
that he will be treated leniently if only he confesses. Confrontation brings on
despair; minimization supplies a lifeline. Together, they break down many
suspects.
The problem is that these tactics are too powerful, i.e., can break down the
innocent as well as the guilty. Evidence that the Reid Technique breaks down
14 John Reid passed away in 1982, and his original collaborator, Fred Inbau, passed away in
1998. The lead authors of the fourth and fifth editions are Joseph Buckley, who also assisted with the
third edition, and Brian Jayne. For the sake of convenience, I shall use "Reid authors" throughout
this essay to denote authors of all editions of the Reid Manual.
15 The full nine steps are: Step 1-Direct, positive confrontation. Step 2-Theme
development. Step 3-Handling denials to get a confession. Step 4-Overcoming objections. Step
5-Procurement and retention of suspect's attention. Step 6-Handling the suspect's passive mood.
Step 7-Presenting an alternative question. Step 8-Having the suspect orally relate various details
of the offense. Step 9-Converting an oral confession into a written confession. INBAU, supra note
6, at 185-328.
16 The Reid Manual takes a somewhat elliptical approach to confronting suspects with claims
of evidence that does not actually exist. At one point it states, with seeming approval, that "[i]n some
cases, an investigator may falsely imply, or outright state, that evidence exists that links the suspect to
the crime," id. at 351, and the authors observe that "[i]t is our clear position that merely introducing
fictitious evidence during an interrogation wouldn't cause an innocent person to confess." Id. at 352.
For tactical reasons, however, they advise "great caution" in making such claims, id. at 42, at one
point suggesting it only as a "last resort effort," id. at 352, both because courts may look askance at
such tactics, and the interrogator risks losing credibility in the eyes of the suspect.
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innocent suspects is threefold. First, as an empirical matter, we find these
measures utilized in many cases of proven false confessions." Second, we find
this effect reproduced in laboratory studies.' 8  Third, social scientists have
explicated how, applying basic principles of decision-making, we should expect
the Reid Technique to produce false confessions, i.e., this seemingly
counterintuitive phenomenon makes perfect sense once we understand the
method's basic workings.19 After all, the very purpose of the Reid Technique is to
put the suspect in an untenable situation where confession appears to be the only
means of escape.20
It might seem obvious that the confrontation/minimization combination,
employed by authority figures on an isolated and powerless individual, risks
breaking down the innocent as well as the guilty.2 1 Yet the purveyors of the Reid
" See Steven A. Drizin & Richard A. Leo, The Problem of False Confessions in the Post-
DNA World, 82 N.C. L. REV. 891 (2004).
18 In the seminal study, college students were instructed to type on a desktop computer but
warned that the Alt key was off limits, as hitting it would cause the computer to crash. Saul M.
Kassin & Katherine Kiechel, The Social Psychology of False Confessions: Compliance,
Internalization and Confabulation, 7 PSYCHOL. SCI. 125 (1996). Subsequently, each subject was told
that the computer had crashed and was accused, falsely, of having hit the Alt key. All students
denied their guilt. But when a confederate of the experimenter confronted the suspect with the claim
that she witnessed them hitting the forbidden key, many of the students acknowledged guilt and
signed a written confession. Interviews afterward revealed that some of these students actually came
to believe they were responsible; some even concocted details of how they hit the Alt key. One
limitation of this study is that the participants faced no penalty for confessing. However, subsequent
studies replicated the effects even when the subjects were told that they would be fined or otherwise
punished for hitting the prohibited key. See Robert Horselenberg et al., Individual Diferences and
False Confessions: A Conceptual Replication of Kassin and Kiechel, 9 PSYCHOL. CIM. & L. 1
(2003); Allison Redlich & Gail Goodman, Taking Responsibility for an Act Not Committed: The
Influence ofAge and Suggestibility, 27 L. & HuM. BEHAV. 141 (2003).
A different experiment concerns the risks of minimization. People were assigned tasks in pairs
but also given tasks they were supposed to do alone. Subjects were then accused of having
impermissibly cooperated-in effect, cheating. Most of them denied guilt. But interrogators
introduced minimization themes to some of the subjects, implying that their offense was not so bad,
and they might not be punished severely if they confessed. Within this group, the false confession
rate tripled. See Melissa Russano et al., Investigating True and False Confessions Within a Novel
Experimental Paradigm, 16 PSYCHOL. Sci. 481, 484 (2005).
19 See Ofshe & Leo, supra note 4, at 983 (1997) ("[P]olice-induced false confessions, like
truthful ones, are rational responses to the influence tactics and manipulation strategies that American
police use during interrogation.").
20 There is another category of false confessions where the suspect actually comes to believe
in his own guilt, or at least to regard it as possible. The "internalized false confession" is discussed
infra, see text accompanying notes 31-35.
21 I have elsewhere noted (and tried to explain) the irony that in fact the risks used to be
recognized as obvious-which is why, in the nineteenth century, the Supreme Court banned the
admissibility of confessions that followed even the slightest or most indirect threats or minimization.
See Alan Hirsch, Threats, Promises, and False Confessions: Lessons of Slavery, 49 How. L.J. 31, 32
("Though it may seem odd, the judicial system has taken a huge step backwards from the Nineteenth
Century" in safeguarding against false confessions.).
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Technique clearly did not envision this result-no servants of law enforcement
22would endorse a method that predictably endangers the innocent. How, then,
could Reid and Associates be confident that its method does not, in fact, break
down innocent as well as guilty suspects?
The answer emerges from a careful reading of the Reid Manual. Perhaps the
single most important sentence of the 450 page manual occurs near the outset-in
full italics, suggesting the authors' recognition of its significance: "An
interrogation is conducted only when the investigator is reasonably certain of the
suspect's guilt."23 Later, in the course of describing the confrontational nature of a
typical interrogation, the authors see fit to reiterate this key point: interrogation
techniques are confined to situations "where the suspect's guilt seems to the
investigator to be definite or reasonably certain."24 Or, as one of the authors told a
skeptical questioner at a conference, he does not worry about eliciting confessions
from the innocent because "we do not interrogate innocent people."25
How do Reid-trained interrogators assess guilt prior to an interrogation? In
some cases, they do so through the investigatory process, gathering evidence that
objectively establishes guilt. Of course, in such cases a confession, while
welcome, is less important. But Reid-trained investigators learn that in most cases
the onerous fact-gathering process can be side-stepped. The assessment of
innocence and guilt can instead be made in the course of a non-accusatory
interview, during which the interrogator sizes up the suspect's body language and
response to verbal cues. In fact, the Reid Manual devotes almost as much space to
this pre-interrogation interview process, which determines whether the interviewee
will subsequently be interrogated, as to the actual interrogation process itself. As
the authors state, where evidence is lacking, "conducting a nonaccusatory [pre-
interrogation] interview of the suspect is indispensible with respect to identifying
whether the suspect is, in fact, likely to be guilty." 26
Unfortunately, this crucial aspect of the Reid approach fails to survive
scrutiny. Study after study establishes that humans, trained interrogators included,
22 Indeed, seeking to remove any doubt on this point, the Reid authors see fit to clarify that
"we are opposed to the use of any interrogation tactic or technique that is apt to make an innocent
person confess." INBAU, supra note 6, at xi. Such a statement was present as early as the third
edition in 1986, see INBAU, supra note 10.
23 INBAU supra note 6, at 5.
24 Id. at 201.
25 Saul M. Kassin & Gisli Gudjonsson, The Psychology of Confessions; A Review of the
Literature and Issues, 5 PSYCHOL. SCI. PuB. INT. 33, 36 (2004).
26 INBAU, supra note 6, at 6.
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are poor lie detectors.27 No one, or virtually no one, can determine a person's guilt
through the interviewing process at the heart of the Reid approach.2 8
The propensity of the Reid Technique to cause false confessions follows
inexorably from the two points developed above: detectives determine whom to
interrogate based on a deeply flawed screening process,29 then subject those who
slip through the screen (that is, those wrongly betrayed by their body language or
verbal responses) to an interrogation potent at overcoming resistance by
convincing people they are better off confessing.
The above is sufficiently well established as to command near unanimity from
those conversant with the relevant literature developed over the last few decades.30
And Reid and Associates, in the newer editions of its manual, has offered at least
somewhat of a response to these discomfiting truths. The 2001 edition included a
lengthy new chapter, "Distinguishing between True and False Confessions," and
the 2011 edition added material to that chapter. Both the 2001 and 2011 editions
also added important material to a chapter on "Behavior Symptom Analysis"-the
methods used to screen out the innocent in the pre-interrogation interview.
To determine the adequacy of these additions to meet the problem of false
confessions, we shall look primarily at the most recent and comprehensive edition
of the Reid Manual, the fifth edition published in 2011. Do the authors candidly
acknowledge the scope of the problem of false confessions? Do they recommend
measures that substantially ameliorate the problem?
II. CONCESSIONS AND ACCOMMODATIONS
In at least four respects, the Reid authors deserve credit for learning from the
confessions literature and making appropriate adjustments. First, the authors make
useful recommendations to prevent the "internalized false confession," where a
27 See, e.g., Christian Meissner & Saul M. Kassin, "He's Guilty!": Investigator Bias in
Judgments of Truth and Deception, 26 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 469, 470 (2002) (citing and summarizing
studies).
28 One study suggests that the occasional very rare person does indeed possess the power to
detect lies. In this study, the researchers tested over 20,000 individuals' ability to detect lies and
found that 50 (or .25%) had an accuracy rate of 80% or higher. Maureen O'Sullivan & Paul Ekman,
The Wizards ofDeception Detection, in DECEPTION DETECTION IN FORENSIC CONTEXTS 269 (Granhag
& Stromwall eds. 2004). The issue of behavior symptom analysis is discussed in much greater detail
infra, notes 77-84 and accompanying text.
29 See Richard A. Leo & Stephen Drizin, The Three Errors: Pathways to False Confession
and Wrongful Conviction, in POLICE INTERROGATIONS AND FALSE CONFESSIONs 12 (Lassiter &
Meissner eds., 2010) (The path to false confession begins when "investigators first misclassify an
innocent person as guilty.").
30 The qualification is necessary because of a few high-profile skeptics. See, e.g., Paul
Cassell, The Guilty and the Innocent: An Examination of Alleged Cases of False Confessions of
Wrongful Conviction from False Confessions, 22 HARv. J.L. & PUB. PoL'y 526 (1999).
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person confronted with allegedly objective evidence of his guilt actually comes to
believe he committed the crime.3'
To be sure, the manual commences its discussion of this counterintuitive
phenomenon with skepticism, 32 and its later claim that the internalized false
confession phenomenon is "not implausible" seems unnecessarily grudging given
that quite a few such cases have been documented. Nevertheless, the authors
propose that, when confronted with a suspect distrustful of his memory, "the
investigator must be certain not to . .. suggest that the suspect committed the crime
even if he has no recollection of doing so. . . . [A]t no time should an investigator
attempt to persuade a suspect that he is guilty of a crime he claims not to remember
committing." 34 Further, they admonish interrogators not to confront such a suspect
claiming to have evidence against him that they do not in fact have.35
Unfortunately, the Reid authors' commendable effort to prevent internalized
false confessions may not go far enough. They warn against expressing certainty
of guilt and introducing false evidence after a suspect claims not to remember
committing the crime. But internalized false confessors may exhibit no uncertainty
of memory until they are confronted with false evidence. 36  Nevertheless, the
recommended prophylactic measures are at least steps in the right direction.
Another step in the right direction stems from recognition that certain
populations-particularly juveniles and those with diminished mental capacity or
suffering from mental illness-are especially prone to false confessions. The Reid
authors recommend that such groups be spared the more aggressive aspects of the
31 For the leading analysis of this phenomenon, see Saul M. Kassin, Internalized False
Confessions, in 1 HANDBOOK OF EYEWITNESS PSYCHOLOGY 175 (Toglia, Read, Ross, & Lindsay, eds.,
2007).
32 See INBAU, supra note 6, at 341-42 ("A claim that a confession was coerced internalized is
an inviting defense for a guilty defendant who chooses to retract his confession . ... [A]ll a defendant
has to do, when claiming a coerced internalized confession, is take the position that he believed he
was guilty of the crime at the time of the confession.").
33 See Kassin, supra note 31, at 181-82.
34 See INBAU, supra note 6, at 350-51.
35 Id. at 352. Indeed, the introduction of false evidence seems to trigger most internalized
false confessions, such as the well-publicized case of Marty Tankleff. In a state of shock after having
discovered his parents' brutalized corpses, Tankleff was told (falsely) by the police that his father, in
a dying declaration, declared his son the culprit. Concluding that he must have committed the crime
and blacked out, Tankleff confessed. His conviction was later reversed under circumstances leaving
little doubt as to his innocence, and the government did not retry him. See Bruce Lambert, No Retrial
in '88 Double Killing on Long Island, N.Y. TIMES, (July 1, 2008),
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/07/01/nyregion/01tankleff.html?r-0.
36 See Kassin, supra note 31, at 181.
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Reid Technique. If that admonition is followed, the prevalence of false
confessions will surely be reduced.38
To their credit, in the fourth and fifth editions of their manual, the Reid
authors also emphasize the importance of corroborating confessions and the
suspicious nature of confessions that remain uncorroborated. 3 9 They correctly note
that "the best type of corroboration is in the form of new evidence that was not
known before the confession." 4 0 Related, but even more important, the authors
insist that "[w]hen developing corroborative information, the investigator must be
certain that the details were not somehow revealed to the suspect through the
questioning process, news media, or the viewing of crime scene photographs."4'
This admonition is most welcome in light of the frequent failure of interrogators to
follow such a course. In many cases of proven false confessions, the interrogators
apparently supplied the suspect details of the-crime.42
Finally, the Reid authors endorse the electronic recording of interrogations,43
a measure enthusiastically promoted by most reformers in this area and
increasingly embraced by law enforcement. 4 To their credit, they note that the
idea of mandatory recording was "not embraced with open arms by the law
enforcement community" but that concerns proved unwarranted.45
With respect to each of the issues discussed in this section, Reid and
Associates is now in substantial agreement with its long-time critics, a noteworthy
development.46  In several other areas, however, sharp disagreement persists,
beginning with the very purpose of the Reid Technique.
3 INBAU, supra note 6, at 352-54.
38 See Drizin & Leo, supra note 17, at 944 (in study of proven false confessions, almost one-
third were juveniles, and almost one-third were either mentally retarded or suffered from mental
illness).
39 INBAU, supra note 6, at 354-60.
40 Id. at 306.
41 id
42 See Brandon Garrett, The Substance ofFalse Confessions, 62 STAN. L. REv. 1051 (2010).
43 INBAU, supra note 6, at 325.
4 See Brian Jayne, Empirical Experiences of Required Electronic Recording of Interviews
and Interrogations on Investigators'Practices and Case Outcomes, 4 LAw ENFORCEMENT EXECUTIVE
FORUM 103 (2003) (in survey of investigators in Alaska and Minnesota, which require recording,
85% supported the law or said their interrogations were unaffected by it); Kassin et al., supra note 1,
at 25 (electronic recording of confessions has "drawn advocates from a wide and diverse range of
professional, ideological, and political perspectives"). Recorded interrogations put judges (in
suppression hearings and bench trials) and juries in better position to consider the interrogative
pressures applied to a suspect, to evaluate whether details in the confession may have been supplied,
and to resolve factual disputes over exactly what transpired prior to the confession. In addition, a
policy of recording can deter interrogative excesses.
45 INBAU, supra note 6, at 50.
46 Another important area of potential agreement, the need to avoid lengthy interrogations, is
difficult to assess because of the Reid Manual's vagueness. Data establish a correlation between the
length of interrogations and risk of false confessions; in 84% of false confessions the interrogation
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III. DENIAL
A. Frequency of False Confessions
In assessing the adequacy of the new material in the latest editions of the Reid
Manual, one crucial threshold question concerns the extent to which the authors
acknowledge the underlying problem. Notwithstanding their endorsement of
certain reforms, they are unlikely to craft meaningful changes in their approach
unless they consider the problem of false confessions sufficiently widespread as to
warrant a serious response.
Near the outset of their new chapter on false confessions (added in the fourth
edition and revised in the fifth), the authors address that issue directly: "There is no
question that interrogations have resulted in false confessions from innocent
suspects. However, . . . [e]ven critics of police interrogation agree that most
confessions are true."47 This statement sets the bar absurdly low. Of course most
confessions are true. It is horrifying to imagine a regime of law enforcement that
produced mostly false confessions. But are the critics of the Reid Technique
correct to maintain that false confessions are surprisingly prevalent? The Reid
authors dismiss that possibility, declaring toward the end of the chapter on false
confessions that "the research findings presented in this chapter reveals that false
confessions do occur but that they are rare occurrences."48
However, the basis of this conclusion is unclear. The chapter's only
"findings" with respect to the frequency of false confessions are references to
outdated or irrelevant works. Drawing on an oft-cited 1987 study by Hugo Bedau
and Michael Redelet of wrongful convictionS49 (not limited to cases involving
confessions), the Reid authors note forty-nine "possible false confession[s]."50
Later, they cite the "60 possible false confessions" identified by Professors Richard
Ofshe and Richard Leo in a 1998 essay.5' But Professors Bedau and Radelet were
exceeded six hours. See Drizin & Leo, supra note 17. The Reid Manual says virtually nothing about
the appropriate length of interrogations, but a few comments are potentially significant: "A properly
conducted interrogation that lasts 3 or 4 hours, for the ordinary suspect, is certainly not so long as to
cause the levels of emotional or physical distress that constitute duress," but "[a] suspect who has
maintained his innocence and made no incriminating statements for 8 or 10 hours has not offered any
behavior to account for this lengthy period of interrogation." INBAU, supra note 6, at 347, 348. To
the extent these statements together can be read as suggesting that interrogations should rarely exceed
four hours, and almost never reach eight, they represent welcome cautions.
47 Id. at 339.
48 Id. at 367.
49 Hugo Bedau & Michael Radelet, Miscarriage of Justice in Potentially Capital Cases, 40
STAN. L. REv. 21 (1987).
50 INBAU, supra note 6, at 340.
51 Id. at 363, citing Richard Ofshe & Richard Leo, The Consequences of False Confessions:
Deprivations of Liberty and Miscarriages of Justice in the Age of Psychological Interrogation, 88 J.
CluM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 429 (1998).
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studying only capital cases-not to mention doing so a quarter century ago. The
Ofshe/Leo article is also more than a decade old.
The Reid authors also mention a 1996 observational study of 182
interrogations by three police departments and declare that "not a single false
confession was reported." 52 But this study made no effort to identify true or false
confessions. Its purpose was entirely different: to identify what interrogation
techniques law enforcement utilizes in practice.
Inexplicably, the Reid authors ignore much more recent and relevant data,
particularly the most important empirical study of false confessions--one by
Professors Richard Leo and Steven Drizin published in 2004 that identifies and
analyzes 125 cases of proven false confessions.54 The omission of this study
(published seven years before the fifth edition of the Reid Manual) leads the Reid
authors astray in crucial respects. They ask rhetorically, "how does a researcher go
about proving that any given confession is actually false?"55  Their implicit
answer: he cannot. Thus, in the course of dismissing the Ofshe/Leo study of sixty
false confessions, they note that only thirty-four were classified as "proven" false 6
and further observe that one commentator studied these cases and opined that
several of the defendants were in fact guilty.57  More generally, they assert that
alleged identification of false confessions fails because of an "inherent weakness"
of such efforts, the "failure to establish ground truth."58  The Drizin/Leo study
ignored by the Reid authors, however, not only dispensed with confessions that
52 Id. at 366.
s3 See Richard Leo, Inside the Interrogation Room, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 266, 268
(1996). Similarly, the Reid authors cite a survey of 112 investigators in Alaska and Minnesota who
received training in Reid, and note that only eighteen out of 3,162 confessions were suppressed by
trial courts. INBAU, supra note 6, at 366. They assert that such data "indicate that the vast majority
of confessions obtained through interrogation are noncoercive and held to be admissible as
evidence." Id. Here, the Reid authors have constructed a straw man. No one disputes that most
confessions are legitimate. Certainly no one disputes that courts routinely uphold confessions, even
those obtained by aggressive use of the Reid Technique. Indeed, reformers protest that courts have
become a rubber-stamp for law enforcement, failing to protect against unreliable and improperly
obtained confessions. See, e.g., RICHARD LEO, POLICE INTERROGATION AND AMERICAN JUSTICE 265
(2008) (because judges, too, are "subject to tunnel vision and confirmation bias" and thus assume
confessions to be true, "the formal presumption of innocence is quickly transformed into an informal
presumption of guilt."). To cite the courts as proof that confessions are obtained properly is to
proceed circularly, since the wisdom of the courts in this area is itself at issue. See, e.g., Alan Hirsch,
Confessions and Harmless Error: A New Argument for the Old Approach, 12 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L.
1, 7-13 (2007) (noting tendency of judges, like everyone else, to find false confessions
counterintuitive).
54 Drizin & Leo, supra note 17.
55 INBAU, supra note 6, at 363.
56 id
s7 Id. at 376, n.32 (referring to Cassell). The Reid authors do not note or cite Ofshe's and
Leo's reply, The Truth About False Confessions and Advocacy Scholarship, 37 CRIM. L. BULL. 293
(2001).
58 INBAU, supra note 6, at 363.
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were probably or likely false, sticking to those proven false, but also explained the
bases for determining that a particular confession was false. These bases leave
little room for skepticism.
Professors Leo and Drizin identified four ways confessions were proven false
to their satisfaction. 5 9  First, in many cases, scientific proof-typically DNA
tests-established that the person who confessed could not have been the culprit.
Second, in some cases the actual culprit was apprehended and irrefutable evidence
established his guilt. Third, in a few cases, evidence turned up that established the
physical impossibility that the confessor committed the crime (e.g., it turned out he
was in prison or out of the country when the crime was committed). Fourth, in a
few cases it turns out there was no crime at all (e.g., someone confessed to murder,
but later the alleged victim turned up alive). Although, as noted, one commentator
has questioned the innocence of some of the alleged false confessors in the earlier
Ofshe/Leo study,60 no one has disputed the innocence of the 125 false confessors
cited in the Drizin/Leo study.
For a variety of reasons, experts in the area are virtually unanimous in the
view that the cases of proven false confessions represent only the tip of a large
iceberg. First, as noted, in the aforementioned Drizin/Leo study, the authors were
conservative-they omitted many confessions that they identified as probably false
because they were not quite proven false.
Second, most criminal cases take place under the public radar, such that, if
they resulted in a false confession, it would go undetected. For one thing, most
cases are resolved by guilty plea.62 We know that some guilty pleas involve false
confessions,63 but once the party has pled guilty there is usually no mechanism for
probing or challenging the confession.
Third, the majority of proven false confessions have been so identified by
virtue of scientific evidence. But in many cases there is no relevant scientific
evidence available, or the prosecution opts not to have what is available adequately
tested, and the defense lacks the resources to do so. 4
5 Drizin & Leo, supra note 17, at 924-26.
60 Cassell, supra note 30, at 524. His basis for doing so was at times dubious. For example,
if anyone, including the prosecutor, maintained that the defendant was guilty, Cassell considered the
confession disputed rather than proven false. However, prosecutors have insisted on guilt even in
cases of DNA exoneration. See, e.g., Alan Hirsch, The Tragedy of False Confessions (and a
Common Sense Proposal), 81 N.D. L. REv. 343, 348-49 (2005) (citing cases and seeking to explain
the phenomenon).
61 Supplementing the Drizin/Leo study with cases of proven false confessions from other
studies, Professor Leo subsequently identified 250 such cases. LEO, supra note 53, at 244.
62 See, e.g., ROBERT P. BuRNs, THE DEATH OF THE AMERICAN TRIAL 85 (2011) (fewer than 5%
of criminal cases go to trial).
63 See Drizin & Leo, supra note 17, at 961 (eleven cases of guilty pleas in the study of 125
proven false confessions).
6 See Frank Horvath & Robert Meesig, The Criminal Investigation Process and the Role of
Forensic Evidence: A Review ofEmpirical Findings, 41 J. FORENSIC Sci. 963 (1996).
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Fourth, there is reason to believe that large numbers of false confessions occur
in specialty courts like juvenile courts and mental health courts that deal with
vulnerable populations, precisely those defendants at the greatest risk of falsely
confessing. In many jurisdictions, these proceedings are confidential, and the
media tend not to cover these courts as part of their regular beats.
Finally, interrogators themselves indicate that false confessions are
surprisingly frequent. In one self-report study of more than six hundred
professional interrogators, based on their personal experience and observation they
estimated that, on average, almost five percent of innocent suspects confess.65
The Reid authors make no mention of the latter survey, just as they ignore the
Drizin/Leo study of proven false confessions. They conclude their cavalier
treatment of the frequency of false confessions as follows: "This is not to suggest
that the issue of possible false confessions be ignored but rather that it be kept in
perspective."66 Employing selective data and analysis, they have not so much kept
the issue in perspective as they have trivialized it.
B. Purpose ofInterrogations
Even allowing that false confessions are a serious problem, it does not follow
that the Reid Technique contributes substantially to the problem. In new material
that surfaces in the fifth edition of their manual in 2011, the Reid authors insist that
their critics misunderstand and misrepresent the Reid Technique, starting with its
very purpose.
They cite as representative of the distortion an expert report submitted by
67Professor Richard Leo in a case where he served as an expert witness. Leo's
report declared that "[t]he sole purpose for custodial interrogation is to elicit a
confession. Contemporary American interrogation methods are structured to
persuade a rational person who knows he is guilty to rethink his initial decision to
deny culpability and instead choose to confess."68 The Reid authors responded:
"we certainly take issue with the stated purpose of an interrogation being to elicit a
confession. On page 5 of Chapter 1 of this book, we state .. . [that] '[t]he purpose
of an interrogation is to learn the truth.'" 69  Indeed, they emphasize, when an
innocent suspect is cleared, "the interrogation must be considered successful
because the truth was learned., 0
65 Kassin et al., Police Interviewing and Interrogation: A Self-Report Survey of Police
Practices and Beliefs, 31 L. & HuM. BEHAV. 381 (2007).
66 INBAU, supra note 6, at 366.
67 Id. at 367 (citing EXPERT REPORT IN CASE OF BRENDAN DASSEY, (Richard Leo))
[hereinafter, LEO REPORT].
68 INBAU, supra note 6, at 367 (citing LEO REPORT).
69 Id. at 368.
70 id
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It may be that Professor Leo should have acknowledged that the Reid Manual
declares discovery of truth to be its goal and the clearing of an innocent suspect a
successful outcome. But the Reid authors' response ignores a critical point
discussed in Part I above: their manual instructs interrogators to screen out the
innocent before interrogation and thus to interrogate only the guilty. With that
point in mind, it seems hard to question Professor Leo's claim that the purpose of
the interrogation is to produce a confession. If Reid-trained investigators screen
out the innocent as per instructions, their interrogations will indeed succeed only
when they elicit confessions. Presumably this is behind the following accounting
by the authors: "The most experienced and, skilled investigators achieve a
confession rate of only about 80%. With respect to the remaining 20% ... there is
a high probability that most, if not all of this group were guilty of the crime."'
Indeed, earlier in the very chapter where they take Professor Leo to task for
allegedly misrepresenting the purpose of their technique, the Reid authors
explicitly declare that "[t]he purpose of an interrogation is to learn the truth and
persuade a suspect whom the interrogator believes to be lying about involvement
in a crime to tell the truth about the crime that they committed."7 2 The alleged
conflict between Professor Leo and the Reid authors dissolves: Yes, the purpose of
the Reid Technique is to elicit truth, but that is not in conflict with the assertion
that the purpose is to elicit a confession. In the guilt-presumptive Reid
environment,73 eliciting truth and eliciting a confession amount to the same thing. 74
Critically, steps eight and nine of the interrogation process, presented as the
culmination of the interrogation, are "Having the Suspect Orally Relate Various
Details of the Offense" and "Converting an Oral Confession into a Written
Confession." This is not presented as. one possible outcome, with other protocols
recommended if it turns out the suspect is innocent. Rather, obtaining a confession
is presented as the culmination of a successful interrogation. Thus, Professor
Leo's characterization of the.purpose of the Reid interrogation is supported by a
fair reading of the entire manual, notwithstanding the authors' contention that they
seek truth, not necessarily confessions.
71 Id. at 371-72 (emphasis added).
72 Id. at 344 (emphasis added).
7 For development of the notion of the Reid approach as "guilt-presumptive," see Kassin &
Gudjonsson, supra note 25, at 41-42.
74 At other points in their manual as well, the Reid authors implicitly acknowledge as much.
The manual notes that the defense attorney will likely argue that the interrogation tactic of cutting off
denials "prevented his client from presenting his side of the story," and proposes that law
enforcement give the following response: in the pre-trial interview, the defendant "was provided with
ample opportunity to tell the truth." INBAU, supra note 6, at 193. Here, the analysis tracks the
different goals of the two parts of the Reid process: the interview, but not the interrogation, gives the
suspect the opportunity to establish his innocence.
7 Id. at 303-27.
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C. Causes of False Confessions
The Reid authors part company with their critics not only with respect to the
purpose but also the effects of their approach to interrogation. They emphatically
reject the contention that the Reid Technique contributes substantially to the
problem of false confessions.
1. The Screening Interview
To the extent the Reid authors believe in the ability of investigators to screen
out the innocent during a non-accusatory interview and thus interrogate only the
guilty, interrogation cannot create a risk of false confessions. Accordingly, it is
crucial to evaluate their response to the contention, buttressed by many studies,
that humans are poor lie detectors and the screening process is accordingly
doomed.
The 2011 edition of the Reid Manual includes no fewer than six chapters
instructing investigators how to determine guilt from "behavior symptom analysis"
[BSA] during the pre-interrogation interview. The most important chapter
includes instruction with respect to three different aspects of behavior: verbal
behavior, paralinguistic behavior, and nonverbal behavior.
In terms of verbal behavior, the Reid authors promote propositions like:
"Truthful subjects respond to questions directly; deceptive subjects may answer
evasively." "Truthful subjects may deny broadly; deceptive subjects may offer
specific denials." "Truthful subjects offer confident and definitive responses;
deceptive subjects may offer qualified responses." "Truthful subjects will offer
spontaneous responses; deceptive subjects may offer rehearsed responses."
In the section on "paralinguistic behavior," interrogators are taught to
determine the truthfulness of interviewees based on, among other things, "response
length," "response delivery," "continuity of the response," and "erasure
behavior."78 In the section on non-verbal behavior, they are taught to distinguish
truthfulness from deception by analyzing the interviewee's posture and gestures.
This section includes photographs of interviewees accompanied by labels such as,
"truthful frontally aligned posture" and "deceptive non-frontal alignment."79
Unfortunately, overwhelming evidence suggests that these methods do not
work. In the 2001 edition of their manual, the Reid authors touted their own
studies in the 1990s conducted pursuant to grants from the National Security
76 To the contrary, the authors conclude that "our experience has been that [our] interrogation
techniques, if used in accordance with the guidelines offered in this text, greatly reduce the risk of an
innocent suspect confessing." Id. at 366.
n7 Id. at 1 11-17.
Id. at 117-21.
* Id at 121-36.
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Agency.s0 The experimenters selected and edited interview tapes from the Reid
collection, showed them to several staff members of Reid and Associates, and
reported that they accurately determined truthfulness more than 80% of the time.
In an essay in 2008, Professor Saul Kassin noted that, among other problems, the
data were extremely limited, and ground truth was not established with certainty.8'
Related and more importantly, Kassin noted that studies in "laboratories all over
the world" during the next decade produced very different results-an accuracy
82
rate barely better than fifty percent, or what you would get flipping a coin.
In the 2011 edition of their manual, published three years after Professor
Kassin's appraisal that their own studies are "grossly out of step with basic
science,"83 the Reid authors ignored such criticisms and simply repeated the results
of their studies and the claim that they establish the viability of BSA. They do
acknowledge that subsequent studies produce "rather dismal results" for BSA,84
but they argue that such studies are essentially useless.
The Reid authors note that many of the studies use a mock crime paradigm
which fails to simulate real-life interrogations for several reasons: 1) unlike
interviewees in the real world, those assigned roles "had low levels of motivation
to be believed (in the case of innocent) or to avoid detection (in the case of guilty
suspects).";85 2) the interviews of the role-playing suspects "were not conducted
by investigators trained in interviewing criminal suspects" and did not employ "the
type of structured interview process that is commonly utilized by interrogators in
the field";86 3) in most of the studies, "there was no attempt to establish behavioral
baselines for each suspect so as to identify [his] unique behaviors";87 4) these
studies were "based on the faulty premise that there are specific behavior
symptoms that are unique to truth or deception"; and 5) insufficient consideration
was given to "context." In the real world, but not in these studies, interrogators
can assess "whether specific nonverbal behaviors are appropriate given the verbal
80 Horvath et al., Differentiation of Truthful and Deceptive Criminal Suspects in Behavior
Analysis Interviews, 39 J. FORENSIC Sci. 793 (1994).
81 Saul M. Kassin, Confessions Evidence: Commonsense Myths and Misconceptions, 35
CRIM. JUST. AND BEHAV. 1309, 1310 (2008).
82 Id. An essay by Professor Kassin in 2010 summarized the literature on police-induced
confessions as follows: "Research has consistently shown that most commonsense behavioral cues
are not diagnostic of truth and deception. Hence, it is not surprising as an empirical matter that
laypeople on average are only 54% accurate at distinguishing truth and deception; that training does
not produce reliable improvement; and that police investigators, judges, customs inspectors and other
professionals perform only slightly better, if at all." Kassin et al., supra note 1, at 6.
83 Kassin, supra note 81, at 1310.
84 INBAU, supra note 6, at 103.
85 id
86 Id. at 104.
87 Id
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content of the suspect's response, identifying the consistency of a suspect's
statements across time and with known evidence, and so on.""
The Reid authors summarize these criticisms of the various studies as follows:
"[R]esearch based on artificially motivating subjects to lie or tell the truth does not
identify the ability of appropriately trained investigators to assess the credibility of
people or the information that they receive from real life subjects during properly
structured investigative interviews."89 Or, more succinctly, the laboratory fails to
approximate the real world of criminal investigation.
This critique is obviously correct to some extent but proves too much; no
laboratory experiment perfectly mirrors the real world, but it is clearly
counterproductive to dismiss the best evidence available because of its limitations.
In addition, the Reid authors' specific assertions overlook the heterogeneity of the
relevant studies. While some of the studies involve low-stake lies, others involve
high-stake ones 90-yet still fail to consistently produce impressive rates of
accuracy.91 So too, the contention that investigators' personal involvement would
produce more accuracy has been tested and refuted. 92
Professor Kassin, one of the leading critics of the Reid Technique, has
acknowledged that it "remains a reasonable goal to seek future improvements in
training-to make police better" at lie detection,93 but the purveyors of the Reid
Technique refuse to meet critics like Kassin halfway and acknowledge what
emerges from an objective view of the evidence: there is currently no basis for
confidence that investigators can reliably screen out the innocent through BSA.
Apart from their own limited studies in the 1990s, the Reid authors claim that
several subsequent studies at least indirectly support the viability of BSA. In fact,
the studies they rely on fail to justify resort to BSA as a screening mechanism.
For example, the Reid authors assert that "[a]ccuracy in detecting deception
with real-life suspects is significantly higher than suggested by studies that use
subjects in a mock crime scenario." 94 But the only documentation they offer in
support of this proposition is a 2004 study in which ninety-nine British police
officers were shown videotapes of interviews with fourteen actual suspects and
asked to judge their veracity. The study found that the "[a]ccuracy rates were
88 id
89 Id.
90 Indeed, one article cited favorably by the Reid Authors (and discussed infra notes 104-05)
analyzed the existing literature on lie detection and characterized thirteen studies as "using high
stakes lie scenarios." Maureen O'Sullivan et al., Police Lie Detection Accuracy: The Effect of Lie
Scenario, 33 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 530, 534 (2009).
91 See Kassin & Gudjonsson, supra note 25, at 39.
92 See id. (citing and summarizing studies).
9 Id. at 217.
94 INBAU, supra note 6, at 103.
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higher than those typically found in deception research."9 The mean accuracy of
lie detection rate in this study, however, was only sixty-five percent. While this at
least represents lie detection above the level of chance, it is a rate far from
acceptable for screening out innocent suspects. If Reid-trained interrogators
averaged this rate of success utilizing BSA, far be it from never interrogating
innocent suspects, they would subject roughly one in every three innocent suspects
to interrogation.
Moreover, the very study cited approvingly by the Reid authors actually
offers a devastating critique of the BSA taught by Reid and Associates. To the
extent the British police officers were somewhat successful at detecting lies, it was
despite the methods taught by Reid. When they utilized Reid's BSA, they failed.
The officer-subjects were asked to describe what cues they relied on to detect
truthfulness, and "the more they endorsed Inbau's view on cues to deception . . .
the worse they became at distinguishing between truths and lies." 96 Indeed, one of
the primary conclusions of the study is that, "[o]n the basis of the available
deception research . .. paying attention to cues promoted in police manuals (gaze
aversion, fidgeting, etc.) actually hampers ability to detect truths and lies."97
Significantly, the authors of the study in question have published a much
more recent work on lie detection which summarizes the state of knowledge in this
area as follows:
Five decades of lie detection research have shown that people's ability to
detect deception by observing behavior and listening to speech is
limited-with, on average, 54% of truths and lies being correctly
classified. . . . Other researchers have taught investigators "diagnostic"
cues to deceit. The success of such training programs has been limited,
with only a few percentage points, on average, gained in accuracy.98
The Reid authors also maintain that research shows that "training and
experience in the field of behavior symptom analysis significantly increases the
ability to detect true and false statements." 99 Once again, they rely on a single
study allegedly establishing this point, 00 and the study in question offers no
support for BSA. The study is not directed at evaluating BSA, but something
9s Samantha Mann et al., Detecting True Lies: Police Officers' Ability to Detect Suspects'
Lies, 89 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 137 (2004).
96 Id. at 144. "Inbau" refers to Fred Inbau, co-author of the Reid Manual.
9 Id. at 137 (emphasis added).
98 Aldert Vrij et al., Outsmarting the Liars: Toward a Cognitive Lie Detection Approach, 20
CURRENT DIRECTIONS PSYCHOL. Sci. 28 (2011). Aldert Vrij and Samantha Mann were among the
authors of both this study and the one the Reid authors cite for support. See supra notes 95-97.
9 INBAU, supra note 6, at 103.
1oo Maria Hartwig et al., Strategic Use of Evidence During Police Interviews: When Training
to Detect Deception Works, 30 L. & Hum. BEHAv. 603 (2006).
2014 8 19
OHIO STATE JOURNAL OF CRIANAL LAW
rather different: whether training in the "strategic use of evidence" during an
interview enhances the ability to detect deception. A major concern of Reid's
critics is that BSA is often utilized in the absence of evidence,10 so the findings of
this study-that training in use of evidence can indeed enhance lie detection-
offer small comfort. 10 2
Finally, the Reid authors cite research showing that "[h]igh-stake lies are
detected at higher rates than low-stake lies."' 03 They cite as the support for this
proposition an article that looks at the existing literature, spanning thirty-one
studies of lie detection, and analyzes separately those it classifies as "low stakes"
and "high stakes."'1 The mean accuracy rate found in the high-stakes studies is
roughly sixty-seven percent-once again, a rate that qualifies as small comfort if
such lie detection efforts are relied on to shield the innocent from an aggressive
interrogation designed to break them down. Worse still, while no group of law
enforcement officials scored higher than a mean accuracy of seventy-three percent,
some groups "obtained mean lie detection accuracy scores that were at chance." 05
Since BSA is not limited to officials who demonstrate relative facility with lie
detection (and, it should be stressed, even those at the very high end fail one
quarter of the time), we can infer that numerous innocent persons are judged
deceptive during the screening interview and thus subjected to interrogation.
As it happens, there have been important developments in human lie detection
in recent years, as researchers have uncovered a new approach that seems
promising.10 6  However, Reid and Associates has pointedly not adopted this
approach. 07  Indeed, those in the vanguard of this work assess Reid harshly.
Reid's BSA is "widely taught to practitioners . . . [y]et empirical evidence that
such tools actually work is either weak or non-existing." 0 8
101 The Reid authors themselves acknowledge that "[t]he majority of interrogations are
conducted under circumstances in which the investigator does not have overwhelming evidence that
implicates the suspect-indeed, the decision to conduct as interrogation is an effort to possibly obtain
such evidence." (meaning a confession). INBAU, supra note 6, at 6. Indeed, "[frequently prior to an
interrogation, the only evidence to support a suspect's guilt is circumstantial or behavioral in nature."
Id.
102 Even as regards this specific issue, the study offers no support for Reid's proponents. To
the contrary, the authors specifically criticize the Reid Manual with respect to the treatment
(specifically the timing of disclosure) of evidence during an interview. Hartwig et al., supra note
100, at 604.
103 INBAU, supra note 6, at 103.
10 See O'Sullivan et al., supra note 90.
os Id. at 535.
106 Aldert Vrij & Par Granhag, Eliciting Cues to Deception and Truth: What Matters are the
Questions Asked, I J. APPLIED RES. MEMORY & COGNITION 110 (2012).
107 See Saul M. Kassin, Paradigm Shift in the Study of Human Lie-Detection: Bridging the
Gap Between Science and Practice, I J. APPLIED RES. MEMORY & COGNITION 118, 119 (2012) ("It is
disappointing that the latest edition [of Reid] does not take account of the cognitive load research.").
1os Vrij & Granhag, supra note 106, at 115.
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In sum, while the later editions of the Reid Manual acknowledge the existence
of a body of work calling into question its BSA approach, Reid and Associates
continues to promote that approach and justify doing so by way of a highly
selective and distorted analysis of the data. Extensive evidence belies the
suggestion that Reid-trained investigators interrogate only the innocent.
2. The Interrogation
Even if Reid and Associates conceded that their screening process does not
reliably succeed, they would not concede that the Reid Technique produces false
confessions. They essentially argue in the alternative; on the one hand, they
continue to maintain that their screening interview ensures that they avoid (if not
infallibly at least very effectively) interrogating the innocent. But they also argue
that interrogating the innocent poses little problem in any event; their interrogation
method, they insist, causes only the guilty, not the innocent, to confess.
This argument, made at several points in the fifth edition of the Reid Manual,
is mitigated by an important acknowledgment pervading the manual; explicitly
telling suspects that they face certain punishment unless they confess and
promising leniency if they do confess can indeed break down the innocent. The
Reid authors admonish interrogators not to use these tactics, which are in any case
generally illegal. But, they maintain, anything short of such behavior will not
break down the innocent (except, perhaps, juveniles and persons with serious
mental infirmities).
The Reid authors suggest clear limits to interrogative confrontation. They
note, for example, the impropriety of an interrogator telling a suspect that, if he
maintains his innocence, "I will not only charge you with this offense but also with
obstruction of justice, which involves a mandatory prison sentence." 09 This is
improper "because this incentive could cause an innocent person to confess."110
But such a risk extends only to a direct threat of inevitable consequences;
"[m]erely discussing real consequences" is unproblematic. 11
The Reid authors make a similar move with respect to minimization. They
declare it off-limits to tell a suspect, "if this is the first time you did something like
this, I'll talk to the judge and make sure that he gives you probation,"ll 2 because
such an explicit promise of leniency could cause an innocent person to confess.
By contrast, it is unproblematic to tell the suspect that, "if this is something that
happened on the spur of the moment, that would be important to include in my
report."' 13 Such a statement, according to the authors, provides incentive for the
1o9 INBAU, supra note 6, at 344.
110 Id
' "Id
112 Id. at 345.
113 id.
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guilty to confess, but not the innocent. The Reid position is summarized most
clearly in the following passage:
Because of the fundamental differences between innocent and guilty
suspects, [the innocent] respond differently to the investigator's
persuasive efforts during an interrogation, provided those efforts do not
explicitly state promises of leniency in exchange for a confession or
threaten inevitable harm absent a confession.1 14
The issue is joined. As noted in Part I, critics of the Reid Technique argue
that interrogators can break down an innocent suspect by communicating the
futility of maintaining innocence and the likelihood that leniency will result from a
confession, without making explicit threats and promises.'15 By contrast, the Reid
authors draw a hard and fast distinction between the explicit and implicit,
considering it unproblematic to communicate that a confession will produce a
better result than maintaining innocence, provided interrogators do not cross the
line into definitive threats and punishments." 6
How to resolve this crucial impasse between Reid and Associates and their
critics? A place to start is with a puzzling passage in the Reid Manual, where the
authors acknowledge (albeit in curiously grudging fashion) the possibility that
implied threats and promises can lead people to draw conclusions about their
prospective treatment-while still emphatically rejecting the idea that such
inferences will affect the innocent suspect's decision-making:
For example, if during a homicide interrogation the investigator places
blame onto the victim for causing the suspect to become angry and lose
emotional control, could that statement cause some suspects to believe
that they might be sentenced less severely? Does the investigator's
sympathetic and understanding approach imply to some suspects that a
judge will also be understanding and sympathetic? Will the investigators
intentional avoidance of mentioning negative consequences lead some
suspects to believe that the consequences of their crime are not severe?
In truth, we cannot answer any of these questions with definitive
114 Id. at 422.
115 Thus, for example, social scientists have long argued that minimization leads suspects to
expect leniency by "pragmatic implication." See Saul M. Kassin & Karlyn McNall, Police,
Interrogations, and Confessions: Communicating Promises and Threats by Pragmatic Implication,
15 L. & HUM. BEHAv. 233 (1991).
116 As the Reid authors repeatedly emphasize, courts tend to draw the line in the same place. It
was not always so. In the nineteenth century, the Supreme Court took a hard line on even the most
indirect threats and suggestions of leniency. See Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 542-43 (1897)
(confession "must not be extracted by any sorts of threats or violence, nor obtained by any direct or
implied promises, however slight"); see also Hirsch, supra note 21, at 40-45 (tracing how courts in
the twentieth century circumvented and eventually discarded Bram).
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certainty, but we would have to acknowledge the possibility that some
suspects may form these beliefs. However, the important question to ask
is, Would an innocent suspect be likely to form these beliefs and decide
to confess because of them? To this, the answer is clearly "No!"" 7
It seems odd that the authors only "acknowledge the possibility" that suspects
may be led by minimization themes to consider themselves better off confessing.
The tendency of such tactics, in conjunction with confrontation, to produce that
conclusion by a suspect is essential to the Reid Technique. Suddenly, 350 pages
in, the authors seem uncertain about the effectiveness of their own methods.
Moreover, here and elsewhere they elide a crucial point. They insist on the
irrationality of an innocent person responding to implicit threats and inducements,
ignoring the fact that the conditions of interrogation can produce a feeling of stress
and eventually despair.18 The Reid authors essentially parrot the conventional
sense of false confessions as counterintuitive: why would an innocent person act so
contrary to self-interest? But they ignore the fact that they have themselves
carefully cultivated conditions that create desperation to escape and thus
compromise the rationality of the innocent suspect's calculations."19
As this suggests, when discussing the risk of false confessions, the Reid
Manual virtually ignores what the Reid Technique is all about. Thus, in the course
of arguing that innocent and guilty suspects act differently, the authors give the
following example: "An innocent suspect who is told that it is important to explain
the reason behind committing the crime will predictably reject the investigator's
entire premise and explain that he had no involvement in the crime whatsoever." 20
That may be true at the outset of the interrogation, but it ignores the fact that Reid
interrogators are taught to cut off such denials aggressively in order to convince
the suspect of the futility of maintaining innocence. When that is done over the
course of hours, why should we be confident that the innocent suspect will remain
steadfast? Reid and Associates simply takes this on faith.
117 INBAU, supra note 6, at 346 (emphasis added).
"1 See Ofshe & Leo, supra note 4, at 997-98 ("Interrogation in America is anxiety-provoking
by design . . .. [S]uspects are confined in an unfamiliar setting, isolated from any social support, and
perceive themselves to be under the physical control of the investigator . . .. To overcome a suspect's
resistance, an investigator employs influence techniques that are intended to induce significant
distress and anxiety .... [The suspect] may continue the interaction until he can no longer stand the
strain and must escape the physical confinement, fatigue, and distress of relentless questioning.").
119 That is why Leo and Ofshe refer to the false confession elicited by Reid as "rational choice,
irrational action." See generally id. Given the circumstance deliberately created by the Reid
interrogation, a suspect understandably feels that confession is the only or best escape. In fact,
contrary to what he is led to believe, maintaining innocence is usually not futile, and confessing guilt
will not produce a benign result. But the interrogators go out of their way to create a setting in which
the suspect will conclude otherwise.
120 INBAU, supra note 6, at 346.
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Closely related, the Reid Manual makes another puzzling statement when
seeking to correct what the authors perceive as the mischaracterization of their
technique. It cites the aforementioned expert report by Professor Leo, specifically
his contention that "the first step of an interrogation is to convince the suspect that
his situation is helpless."l 2 1 The authors respond that "[t]his is a completely
inaccurate statement. We have stated numerous times in this text (as well as in our
seminar training materials) that it is improper to tell the suspect that he is facing
inevitable consequences." 22
It is true that the Reid Manual does not explicitly state as a goal making the
suspect feel helpless. However, Professor Leo never claims otherwise. Rather, he
posits that the suspect's feeling of helplessness is a predictable effect of the Reid
Technique, and he and others have explained at length the basis for that belief.12 3
Indeed, such a characterization follows from language that the Reid Manual does
use. For example, the manual instructs interrogators not simply to accuse the
suspect of criminal behavior, but to communicate "absolute certainty" of the
suspect's guilt.' 24
Moreover, the manual discusses at length two key steps-"handling denials"
and "overcoming objections"-that seem calculated to produce a feeling of
helplessness.125 A seventh and often climactic step in the nine-step process
involves presenting the suspect with two alternatives, one substantially more
severe than the other: e.g., he committed pre-meditated murder or negligent
homicide. But why would most suspects-innocent or guilty-opt for either
alternative unless they felt helpless? Producing a feeling of helplessness via
relentless confrontation is central to the Reid Technique, even though the Reid
Manual eschews that characterization.
So too, the Reid authors downplay the effects of minimization-the various
ways of making the suspect believe that his case is "likely to be processed more
favorably by all actors in the criminal justice system if he confesses."l 26 They
insist that such inducements merely "take advantage of one of the fundamental
principles of human nature, namely that criminal suspects justify their crime in
some manner. . . . [But] an innocent suspect who has not gone through the process
of justifying the crime" will be immune to such an appeal.127 Here again, we see
their basic contention: implicit threats and promises have no effect on the innocent
suspect. But the Reid authors make that claim solely by combination of
misdirection and ipse dixit. The innocent suspect will not be prone to
121 Id. at 368 (citing LEO REPORT).
122 id
123 See, e.g., Ofshe & Leo, supra note 4.
124 INBAU, supra note 6, at 193.
125 Id. at 254-81.
126 id
127 id
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minimization because it helps him justify a crime, but for a different reason: it
suggests he will get off relatively easy. The Reid authors offer no reason to
believe that an innocent person, in desperate straits, would not take comfort from
the suggestion of leniency and determine that he was better off confessing.
In the end, the Reid authors offer no justification for the bright line they insist
on-explicit promises and threats forbidden, anything short of that permitted. The
closest they come is to flip the burden of proof. The notion that implied threats or
promises might suffice to cause a false confession cannot be sustained, they say,
because "[t]here are absolutely no data, empirical or statistical, to support such a
claim." 28
That statement is true only if one ignores the use of the Reid Technique in
many cases of proven false confessions and the laboratory studies which buttress
this fact 2 9 and dovetail with what decades' worth of literature in psychology and
decision-making suggests we should expect. 130
There is, in any event, no reason to acquiesce in the notion that the burden of
proof lies with those seeking to safeguard against false confessions. Even if one is
not satisfied that the causal connection between the Reid Technique and false
confessions has been sufficiently established, should not the criminal justice
system err in the direction of resisting a method widely believed (by those who
have studied it) to contribute to false confessions? While we await more definitive
proof, numerous innocent people are at risk.
IV. CONCLUSION
As recognized in Part II of this essay, the fifth edition of the Reid
interrogation manual includes new and useful material that should help mitigate
the serious problem of false confessions. However, as argued in Parts II and III, in
crucial respects the new manual downplays the severity of the problem and turns a
128 INBAU, supra note 6, at 347.
129 See INBAU, supra note 6. The Reid authors are dismissive of laboratory studies which
support the proposition that the confrontation/minimization combination predictably causes false
confessions. They note, correctly, that "it is impossible to reproduce the real life motivational
incentives of someone facing serious consequences as in an actual interrogation." Id at 363. Any
and all laboratory studies of interrogations are "inherently inadequate." Id at 365. This conclusion is
somewhat unfair. The authors of these studies acknowledge their limitations, claiming only that they
reinforce knowledge gained outside the laboratory. For example, the Alt key study, Kassin &
Kiechel, supra note 18, illustrates that confrontation can cause an innocent suspect to internalize guilt
and even fabricate details about his non-existent guilt. This serves as useful reinforcement-not
independent proof-of a counterintuitive phenomenon.
130 For example, the Reid Manual makes no mention of the prominent essay by Professors
Ofshe and Leo that is directly on point. See Ofshe & Leo, supra note 4. Ofshe and Leo explained
that the dangers of the Reid Technique become apparent when we focus on the cost-benefit analysis it
forces on isolated suspects: the belief that maintaining innocence will doom the suspect whereas
confessing will produce a relatively benign outcome. Why would an innocent person, so convinced,
not confess?
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blind eye to the growing body of knowledge about it, either omitting mention of
crucial data or offering unconvincing denials of their relevance.'31 There will be,
no doubt, future editions of the Reid Manual. Let us hope that they are undertaken
in an open-minded spirit and produce substantial changes in methods of
interviewing and interrogation.
m31 The 2011 edition also adds a brief discussion on the admissibility of expert testimony about
confessions, something long promoted by critics of the Reid Technique who want juries educated in
the risks of police-induced confessions. INBAU, supra note 6, at 367-72. The Reid Manual's
discussion of this issue consists primarily of the claim that courts generally disallow such testimony;
it cites and quotes from nine such cases. But one must keep in mind that criminal appeals typically
follow a conviction, and never an acquittal. Accordingly, the published opinions are skewed toward
cases in which such testimony was excluded. In addition, courts of appeals typically find decisions
about admissibility to be within the discretion of the trial court; most of the cases cited by the manual
uphold decisions not to admit the proffered testimony, but do not require such a result. Most
importantly, the manual is highly selective, citing a handful of cases and simply ignoring the many
cases to the contrary. Indeed, one observer maintains that "courts that have considered this issue
have generally concluded that this type of expert testimony is sufficiently reliable to meet the
prevailing standards for the admission of expert testimony." Welsh S. White, Confessions in Capital
Cases, 979 U. ILL. L. REv. 1030-31, n.445 (2003). The Reid authors do acknowledge that "there have
been cases in which the courts have found that it was important to hear from experts on the issue of
false confessions." INBAU, supra note 6, at 372. They then cite and quote from a single case-in the
military system.
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